Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 4

Article 5

1995

Car Dealership Liable for Misrepresenting Vehicle
Odometer Readings
Elizabeth Abbene

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth Abbene Car Dealership Liable for Misrepresenting Vehicle Odometer Readings, 7 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 153 (1995).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol7/iss4/5

This Recent Case is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

RECENT

CA

SES

Car dealership liable for misrepresenting vehicle
odometer readings
by Elizabeth Abbene
In S & S Toyota, Inc. v. Kirby,
649 So.2d 916 (5th Dist. 1995), the
District Court of Appeals of Florida
held that an award of punitive
damages was proper where evidence
at trial established that a car
dealership knew or should have
known that the actual mileage and
usage of a used-car was far in excess
of the mileage on the odometer.
Further, the court held that a jury
award of treble damages under the
federal odometer law was proper
because the jury found that the car
dealership's conduct showed
reckless indifference to the rights of
others. Finally, the court found that a
remittitur or new trial on the issue of
compensatory and punitive damages
was proper absent a clear showing
of abuse of discretion.
Odometer Reading Clearly
Inaccuratein Light of Evidence
In February, 1990 Carrie Kirby
purchased a 1984 Datsun 300 ZX
from S & S Toyota ("Toyota") for
over $10,000. Toyota represented
the vehicle as a "one owner, low
mileage" used-car with 26,000
miles. In fact, the vehicle had six
prior owners. Additionally, the
certificate of title which the previous
owners transferred to Toyota
revealed that the odometer reading
was inaccurate. Subsequently, Kirby
filed suit against Toyota and claimed
that it had misrepresented the
mileage on the vehicle. Kirby sought
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compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees, and treble
damages under the Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act,
15 U.S.C. 1901-1991.
Following a two-day trial, the
jury found Toyota guilty of a
negligent misrepresentation and
awarded Kirby $15,000 in compensatory damages and $35,000 in
punitive damages. Both parties filed
post-trial motions. The court denied
Kirby's motion requesting treble
damages under the federal odometer
law because Kirby had waived this
claim when she elected to proceed
solely on the common law fraud
claim. Toyota filed motions for a
directed verdict and for a new trial,
both of which were denied. Toyota
also filed a motion for a remittitur
on the amount of compensatory and
punitive damages awarded. A
remittitur results in the plaintiff
remitting a portion of a money
damage award which is found to be
excessive as a matter of law. The
court granted Toyota's motion for
remittitur. Kirby, however, did not
accept the remittitur ruling and the
court granted a new trial on the issue
of damages. Both parties filed
appeals from these orders and the
court of appeals subsequently
considered the issues.
Toyota argued that there was
insufficient evidence to sustain an
award of punitive damages and,
therefore, the trial court was
incorrect in denying its motions for
a directed verdict or a new trial on
this issue. According to the court, in

order to support an award of
punitive damages, the character of
the defendant's conduct must be
fraudulent, malicious, deliberately
violent or oppressive; or committed
with such gross negligence as to
indicate a wanton disregard for the
rights of others. In this case, the jury
was properly instructed and could
award punitive damages if Toyota's
conduct was of such character.
Toyota maintained, however, that
there was no special interrogatory
finding at trial that it had acted with
fraud, malice, deliberate violence or
oppression or such gross negligence
as to indicate a wanton disregard for
the rights of others. Furthermore,
Toyota argued that because there
was no special interrogatory finding
at trial, the trial court was prohibited
from supporting the award of
punitive damages. The appellate
court explained that the burden of
introducing the special interrogatory
findings was Toyota's. Thus,
because Toyota had failed to meet its
burden, the appellate court held that
the trial court was correct in
affirming the award of punitive
damages.
PunitiveDamage Award
Appropriate Where Mileage and
Usage of Vehicle Was Clearly in
Excess of Mileage on Odometer
The evidence at trial revealed that
the car had been repainted and had
experienced mechanical problems.
Also, an expert witness testified that
these factors were indicative of a
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vehicle with mileage at least twice
the mileage shown on the odometer.
Moreover, the vehicle's condition
coupled with the certificate of title
indicating that the odometer reading
was inaccurate was sufficiently
within Toyota's expertise. The court
held that the jury could draw any
reasonable inference from the
evidence to find that Toyota's
conduct showed reckless indifference to Kirby's rights and, thus, an
award of punitive damages was
proper.

Treble Damages Appropriate
Under the Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings
Act
On appeal, Kirby argued that the
trial court erred in its finding that the
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost
Savings Act required a specific
intent to defraud. The trial court had
held that there was no basis to award
damages since Kirby did not request
a specific interrogatory finding.
Section 1988 of the statute reads in
part:
(a) Any person who, with
intent to defraud, violates any

requirement imposed under this
subchapter shall be liable in an
amount equal to the sum of:
(1) three times the amount of
actual damages sustained or $1,500,
whichever is greater; and
(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing
liability, the costs of the action
together with reasonable attorney's
fees as determined by the court.
In examining the intent to
defraud language, the appellate court
looked to both the case law and the
legislative history of the federal
odometer law. In determining
whether a particular violation

Loans fall within definition of merchandise under
by Cary Latimer
In Boubelik v. Liberty State Bank, 527 N.W.2d 589
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995), the Minnesota Court of Appeals
held that the general jury instructions given in a fraud
action did not contradict the special verdict form. The
court also held that the trial court did not err in rejecting
the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Furthermore, the court held that a loan fell
within the definition of "merchandise" under the
Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act ("the Act"). Thus, the
trial court erred in dismissing the respondent's claim
under the Act.
Consumer FraudAct claim dismissed
Joseph Baker ("Baker") advised the respondent,
Henry F. Boubelik ("Boubelik") to borrow $75,000 from
Liberty State Bank ("Liberty") in order to invest in a
business operated by Baker. Baker owed over $350,000
in loans to Liberty, and Liberty's representative, John
Wittek, knew of Baker's financial situation. At Baker's
request, Wittek granted the loan to Boubelik on the
condition that Baker would use Boubelik's investment to
pay off some of Baker's outstanding debt with Liberty.
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Subsequently, Baker's business failed, and Liberty
commenced a foreclosure action on Boubelik's collateral.
Boubelik, claiming fraud in connection with the loan,
brought an action against Liberty. The trial court found
that a loan was not "merchandise" under the Act and
dismissed Boubelik's claim. The trial court allowed the
general fraud claim to go to trial, and the jury awarded
Boubelik $123,431 in damages.
Boubelik, claiming that loans are included in the
Act's definition of merchandise, appealed. Liberty also
appealed, alleging that the jury instructions contradicted
the special verdict form and that the trial court should
have granted its motion for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.
Instructions do not contradictspecial verdict form
On appeal, Liberty argued that the jury instructions
and the special verdict form did not have consistent
definitions of fraud. Liberty first cited the jury instructions, which required Liberty to have "actual knowledge" of Baker's fraudulent activities. Liberty then
claimed that the "actual knowledge" standard was
inconsistent with the special verdict form, which
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amounts to an intent to defraud, the
majority of courts are in agreement
that actual knowledge of an inaccurate odometer reading is not
necessary. Constructive knowledge
or reckless disregard for the truth is
sufficient. The legislative history is
consistent with the majority of
courts. If the seller lacks actual
knowledge but in the exercise of
reasonable care he would have
known that the odometer reading
was different than the actual mileage,
then he is liable under the act. The
court held that because the jury
found that there was a misrepresentation on the part of Toyota and that

Toyota's conduct showed reckless
indifference to the rights of others
an award of treble damages and
attorney's fees was proper under the
federal odometer law.
Remittitur Properon the Issue of
Compensatory and Punitive
Damages
Kirby also argued on appeal that
the trial court erred in granting
Toyota's motion for remittitur and
the court should have allowed the
$15,000 compensatory damage
award to stand. On appeal, however,
the court held that absent a clear

showing of abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court, the
remittitur on compensatory and
punitive damages should stand.
Kirby did not produce any evidence
supporting her contention that the
trial court abused its discretion or
that there was any support for the
jury's award of $15,000 in compensatory damages. Therefore, the court
affirmed the trial court's determination that a remittitur on compensatory and punitive damages was
proper.

the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act
Act
Fraud
Definition of Act includes loans
Consumer
instructed
the
jury
to
find
Liberty
liable
if
the
jury
found
Minnesota
the
Liberty knew or should have known of Baker's frauduBoubelik argued that the trial court erred in determinlent activities.
The court disagreed with Liberty. The court declared
that the jury instructions must be read as a whole, and
found that the jury instructions were not confusing or
misleading to the jury when read as a whole. The court
also determined that, even if a slight inconsistency did
exist, the inconsistency was not fundamental and thus
did not amount to reversible error. The court found it
relevant that Liberty's counsel did not object to the jury
instructions; in fact, Liberty's counsel had stated that the
instructions were satisfactory, constituting a waiver of
Liberty's right to object to the instructions. Therefore,
the instructions did not amount to reversible error.
The court also held that the trial court's refusal to
grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict was proper.
The court found that the jury, given Wittek's testimony
that the loan was granted on the condition of paying off
Baker's other debts, reasonably could have determined
that Wittek knew of Baker's poor financial condition.
Therefore, the court held that a reasonable jury had
sufficient evidence to find that the activities of Baker
and Liberty were fraudulent.
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ing that a "loan" was not included in the Act's definition
of "merchandise." Boubelik asserted that "merchandise"
included "services," and that loans constitute services.
The court agreed with Boubelik. Although the Minnesota courts had not yet determined whether a loan
constituted a service, the court looked to the decisions in
other states. The court noted, for instance, that both
Pennsylvania and Montana consider loans to be a
service. The court then considered the nature of a loan,
and determined that a loan is essentially nothing more
than the sale of money, and the sale of money is a
service. Finally, the court noted that the Act is remedial
in nature and should be construed liberally in favor of
consumers.
The court affirmed the trial court's ruling on the jury
instructions and denial of petitioner's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court
remanded the respondent's fraud claim for further
proceedings under the Act.
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